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In a number of articles published in several law magazines Professor
Albert Kocourek has taken occasion to consider and to criticise the
work of the late Wesley N. Hohfeld with respect to our fundamental
legal conceptions. He has generously given credit to Hohfeld's genius
and constructive service, and has done him the signal honor of building
upon his foundation, even though he undertakes extensive repairs and.
alterations.
To one who worked side by side with Hohfeld, discussed matters
with him daily, and approved of most of his results, it would be a pleas-
ure to consider Professor Kocourek's reconstruction in detail, and by
the use of parallel columns and footnotes to obliterate the repairs and
undo the alterations. This would necessitate the reprinting of a great
part of his article, and it is not at all feasible. It seems more desirable
to go straight to the corner-stone of the whole structure, and to present
in independent fashion a theory of jural relations and of law, a theory
that the writer believes to have underlain Hohfeld's classification and
to be the one that also underlies our current judicial reasoning and
terminology.
In determining what is the law in any given case, we are invariably
interested in finding the answer to one question: what will our organ-
ized society, acting through its appointed agents, do? It is often
'necessary for us to know what the forces of nature will do and what
individuals who do not represent organized society will do. Will the
wind blow down my house? Will the rain spoil my hay? Will the
engineer fall asleep? Will thieves break through and steal? Our
prosperity and even our survival depend upon our answers to these
questions, but when we study ihem we are not studying law. But
suppose I ask: If A borrows money of B and fails to repay, will the
court give judgment and the sheriff levy execution? If A attacks B,
and B knocks A down with reasonable- violence, will the court give
judgment against either one and the sheriff enforce the judgment? If
A enfeoffs B of Blackacre and C thereafter breaks the close will the
court award damages to B? Our prosperity and our survival depend
upon our ability to answer these questions also. They deal with the
conduct of societal agents, and when we study them we are studying
law.
'The Hohfeld System (192o) 15 "u. L. REv. 24; Various Definitions of
Jural Relation (i92o) 2o CoL. L. REv. 394; Rights in Rem (192o) 68 PA. L. R.v.
322; Plurality of Advantage and Disadvantage -i .ural Relations (1920) "19
MIcH. L. REv. 47; Tabulae Minores Jurisprudentiae, supra, p. 215.
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The first set of questions we call 'questions of fact', and the answers
to them are answers of fact. The second set of questions we call
'questions of law', and the answers require us to know and to apply a
rule of law. In each case this is equally true whether the answer is
negative or affirmative. The wind will blow, or it will not blow; the
air will move, or it will stay still. The court will give judgment for
A, or it will give judgment for B. The sheriff will levy execution,
or he will not levy execution.
In dealing with law, therefore, we are considering the conduct of
societal agents and the rules expressing that uniformity with which
they are expected to act. These rules are rules of law; but the rules
that enable us to predict merely the action of natural forces or of
individuals who are not societal agents are not rules of law. There is
no supernatural or mystical distinction between physical relations and
legal relations. Rules of physics and rules of law are alike in that
they enable us to predict physical consequences and to regulate our
actions accordingly. When the physical event that we are predicting
is the conduct of a state agent, executive or judicial, acting for society,
the rule that we are applying is called a rule of law; and with respect
to the expected action of societal agents, our relations to our fellow
men are commonly called legal (or jural) relations.2
It is not meant by the foregoing that this is the only possible usage
of the terms in question. It is believed to be the actual usage, and
that it is of advantage to abide by it. According to this usage, there
is no law and there can be no legal relations of any sort where there is
no organized society. The fact that is essential is the existence of
societal force; and the question that is of supreme interest is as to
when and how that force will be applied. What will the community of
'it is pleasant to observe Professor Kocourek's recognition of the fact that
a jural relation is always that of one individual person to another.. (ig2o) i5
IL. L. REv. 26. This fact has a very far-reaching effect upon much juristic
thought and expression. It sends to the scrap heap a deal of juristic nonsense
about corporate "entities" and rights of "the state" and "social interests" and
other cherished fictions--cherished among ourselves as well as among our quon-
dam friends in Prussia. It helps us to realize that acts are always individual;
that pain and pleasure, emotions and desires, are always individual; that rules
of law are made for individuals; and that human and social welfare is, in the
last analysis, always individual welfare.. Labor is not in conflict with capital;
but a laborer with no capital may fight a laborer with capital. "Interests of
personality" do not conflict with "interests of property," because only persons
have interests, either factual or jural. One man's desire to hoard may conflict
with another man's desire to eat, and the bystanders will determine the contro-
versy in accordance with what appear to-be their personal interests; but we are
dealing throughout with the interests of persons and not with the interests of
things or of abstractions. A state, a corporation, a group, a union, can act and
can be affected only through individuals. Societal evolution can take place
only by the evolution of individuals. Socialism is always some form of indivi-
dualism, some combination of individual relations.
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citizens cause their agents to do. It is this multitude of busy little fel-
low citizens who constitute "society" or "the state," and it is their
cumulative strength that constitutes the personified giant whose arm
may be so powerful to aid or to destroy. In law, the ultimate question
is, what will this giant do?
Now with respect to the little individual, who will be called A, in
whose fortunes we may be interested, this giant either will or he will not
act; there is no third possibility (although a wide variety is possible
in the kind of act that he may do). And the little individual, A, him-
self either can or he cannot do something that will stimulate the giant
to act or not to act. The giant sleeps; can I wake him? He wakens;
can I soothe him to inaction? From this it appears that we have four
interesting possibilities: The giant will act so as to affect A, or he will
not so act; A can influence the giant's conduct, or he cannot influence
his conduct. Introduce a second little individual, B, and you at once
double these interesting possibilities. The giant will act for A as
against B, or he will not; he will act for B as against A, or he will
not. A can influence the giant's action with respect to B, or he can-
not; B can influence the giant's action with respect to A, or he cannot.
Of course we are deeply interested in the particular sort of act the
giant will do, and in the various ways in which A and B are able to
affect the giant's conduct. So deeply are we interested in them that
we have used them as a basis for classifying our huge legal mass into
property and contract, crime and tort, equity and admiralty and com-
mon law and law merchant, substantive law and adjective law. All
these classes cross and re-cross and overlap each other; but under-
neath them all we have eight fundamental conceptions with respect to
any two little individuals, A and B. The giant will aid A against B,
or he will not; he will aid B against A, or he will not. A can stimu-
late the giant's conduct with respect to himself and B, or he cannot; B
can so stimulate the giant's conduct, or he cannot.
Now suppose that instead of continuing to repeat these rather lengthy
and cumbrous sentences, we compress the eight ideas into eight single
words. But never fail to remember that behind the single word is the
same mental concept that is behind the longer and more cumbrous sen-
tence. What eight single words shall we choose? By all means follow
established usage if there is any. As usage is not in fact uniform,
follow the usage that is the more common so far as that can be done,
and yet avoid duplication and doubt. After a careful consideration
of the prevailing legal verbiage, Hohfeld made a choice on the fore-
going principles. He chose words already used in judicial reasoning
and he allowed them to keep one of their customary meanings. Since
they had several customary meanings, he tried in the interest of clear-
ness and certainty of expression to slay all the extra meanings and to
force us to adopt invariably the single meaning that he thought the
most useful. His method of doing this was not by formal definition,
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but by arranging his terms in a table of correlatives and a table of
opposites or negatives. 3
What are these terms, and which fundamental concept does each
one express? You will recognize them. The concept that the giant
will aid A by forcibly controlling B's conduct we express by saying that
A has a RIGHT. If the giant will not so aid A, he has NO RIGHT. If
the giant will aid B by using force to control A's conduct, A has a
DUTY. If he will not so aid B, and A is free from such constraint, this
fact is expressed by saying that A has a PRIVILEGE. If A can, by his
voluntary act, influence the giant's conduct with respect to B, whether to
act or not to act, and whether presently or contingently, A has a
POWER. If A cannot do this, he has a DISABILITY. If B can, by his
voluntary act, influence the giant's conduct with respect to A, A has a
LIABILITY. If B cannot do this, A has an ImMUNITY.
Here we have Hohfeld's table of eight terms, expressing certain
conceptions that he believed to be fundamental. They are fundamental
because they are the conceptions out of which in various combinations
we construct our conceptions of property, ownership, trust, easement,
license, right of entry, patent, franchise, chose in action, contract, debt,
quasi-contract, and other important complexities. They are funda-
mental because they are constant elements, into which all of our vari-
able combinations can be analyzed, common denominators to which the
superficially dissimilar, like law and equity, property and contract, can
be reduced. One may well have not the slightest interest in them
except so far as they are useful in actual life and make the administra-
tion of justice more easy and certain. But it is a great service if they
enable us to see similarities and distinctions otherwise concealed and
help us toward a consistent legal sytem. To adopt and use them does
not mean that we must abandon our former language and our former
"Professor Kocourek has difficulty with Hohfeld's term "opposites". As to
this it is unnecessary to take issue with him. To us "opposites" has meant the
same as his "contradictories". For this reason there is no change of position
or inconsistency in Hohfeld's table of "opposites", as is argued at some length
by Professor Kocourek in The Hohfeld System (1920) 15 ILL. L. REv. 24, 26 if.
The term privilege means the negation of duty, and duty means the negation of
privilege. Hohfeld's "privilege" is not the same as Professor Kocourels
"liberty" ("absence of jural relations"). The "juristic utility" of Hohfeld's
table of negatives, which Professor Kocourek was unable to see, lies in its
operation as a strait-jacket forcing each term in the table to express an unchange-
able concept. What the concepts are that were being thus expressed I have
tried to show in the text above. Professor Kocourek's juristic tables, continued
in his later articles in this number and in 19 MICH. L. RE v. 47, indicate a consider-
able change of position from that expressed in 15 ILL. L. REv. 24. Since he did
not observe the strait-jacket and persisted in putting the several terms in Hoh-
feld's mouth to express a concept that Hohfeld did not have, it is impossible to
go through the article in 15 ILL. L. RFv. z4, and answer the detailed objections
therein, without filling many pages. There is little profit in showing that
"I did not say what he said I said".
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more complex conceptions of variable content. We shall still talk of
property and contracts and trusts; but we shall also have at our com-
mand the machinery of a more exact analysis when the case requires it.
The chief value of Hohfeld's tables of correlatives and negatives is
to afford us a quick means of definition and to compel a uniform
usage. Hohfeld might have chosen different terms to express one or
more of his concepts; but the concepts themselves are clear enough,
and his two tables enable us to isolate and identify them with cer-
tainty. It has seemed to me that both judicial and popular usage are
in almost complete agreement on the meaning of two of these terms:
Duty and Power. Working from each of these as a starting point, and
proceeding by the aid of correlatives and negatives, we can arrive
definitely and quickly at the concepts described by Hohfeld's other six
terms.
Nothing will demonstrate the truth of the foregoing except contin-
uous application in concrete cases. To the writer it has been very
helpful at every turn; in constructing the law of offer and acceptance,
in analyzing the assignment of a contract, in defining a franchise, in
determining whether or not a seat on the stock exchange is property.
It would weary the reader for me to make many of these applications;
but let us consider one simple case.
A gives B his note of hand and B lends money in return. At the
due date society commands A to pay B, and threatens certain conse-
quences in case of non-payment. These consequences are not at all
certain to follow, but they are threatened and impending. There is a
societal constraint. The giant will act against A and for B. Observe
that the whole sequence of events is physical. The lending of the
money, the note and its delivery, and the threatened consequences of
judgment by a court and seizure and sale by a sheriff. These conse-
quences are just as truly physical as the personal act of the creditor
would be in demanding payment and grabbing the mone# out of A's
purse. We speak of the law and of legal relations in this case merely
because the physical consequences involve some conduct on the part of
the agents of society and because there are rules expressing a degree
of uniformity in their action, enabling us to predict with some confi-
dence what that action will be.
In order to express the fact that these physical consequences are
impending if A does not pay,3, we say that B has a right to payment,
and that A has a duty to pay. - It is evident that by right and duty we
mean that because of certain facts (loan of money and delivery of note)
certain physical consequences in the form of action by 'the agents of
the state will take place, if the existing rules leading us to expect such
action have not played us false.
Next, suppose that B cancels the note and surrenders it to A. We
know that this terminates A's duty and B's right, that society is no
longer commanding A or threatening him with physical consequences.
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The court will not give judgment and the sheriff will not seize and sell,
unless the existing rules have again played us false. How shall we
express this fact that the physical consequences above mentioned are
no longer impending? Hohfield said: A has a legal privilege not to
pay. B has no longer any right to payment, has no-right.
In chronological sequence, the facts and some of their legal conse-
quences are as follows: (i) A made an offer, creating a power in B
and a liability in A-a power and a liability, because B's voluntary act of
acceptance is a fact which, in connection with other facts, will stimulate
action by state agents towards A, and without which such. other facts
would not stimulate such action. (2) B accepts by lending the money,
thus creating a right in himself and a duty in A-a right and a duty, be-
cause the agents of society will act physically against A for B's benefit.
B has a power also, inasmuch as he can now, by the voluntary act of
surrender or cancellation, influence society not t act against A. (3)
B cancelled the note, thus extinguishing A's duty and his own right
and substituting a privilege in A not to pay.
Let us compare two of these actual situations: first, that existing
just after the loan was made; and second, that existing after cancella-
tion. Now it is obvious that in the first case, physical action by state
agents against A is impending and in the second case it is not. This is
a vast difference. But in both cases we have rules of uniformity by
which we can predict the conduct of the agents of society with respect
to A and B. These rules we daily teach as rules of law and the courts
daily express and apply as rules of law. In the first case the rule is:
The delivery of a note for money lent creates a debt and after the arrival
of the due date will cause the court to adjudge for B and the sheriff to
execute. In the second case the rule is: The cancellation of the note
will discharge the debt and will cause the court not to adjudge for B
and the sheriff not to execute. Each rule helps us to determine, with
more or less certainty, what will be the future physical conduct of the
state agents. That knowledge is more specific in the first case than in
the second. In the first, we predict affirmative and positive action,
although we cannot predict the exact words that the court will use or
the exact goods that the sheriff will seize. In the second, we predict
forbearance, non-action in a certain respect; we do not try to predict
just what the court and sheriff will do affirmatively except that their
positive action will be something other than a judgment for B and a
seizure of A's goods. That is as specific a prediction as the interests
of the parties require. No rule for determining societal action, more
specific in character, is necessary, even though it would be competent to
our legislative authority to create one.
Shall we say that in the first case A and B are in a legal (or jural)
relation and that in the second case they are not? We may if we please,
for each of us has the privilege of constructing his own definitions. He
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who constructs a definition has the rest of the world at a disadvantage.'
This definition is his fixed and immutable starting point, his universal
major premise. Tested by it, the conclusions of all others must be
erroneous. Ex zi termini they are wrong. But whatever our defini-
tion, it remains true that in each of the two cases we are considering
physical facts and are predicting more or less certainly, and more or
less specifically, the physical conduct of the appointed agents of the
" In a very helpful article on Rights in Rem (192o) 68 PA. L. REv. 322, Professor
Kocourek constructs a definition of right in rein as "one of which the essential
investitive facts do not serve directly to identify the person who owes the inci-
dent duty." Hohfeld had suggested that "A multital right, or claim, (right
in rein) is always one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet separate
rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of
persons) but availing respectively against persons constituting a very large and
indefinite class of people." Fundamental Legal Conceptions (917) 26 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 710, 71& A reading of Hohfeld's article shows that he did not
represent this to be a fully worked-out and final definition, and in a footnote
he expressly reserved one matter for treatment in later articles. The present
writer would especially object to the parenthesis "(or single group of persons)"
as describing the possible subject (or "dominus") of a.single right in rem.
Professor Kocourek criticised the definition as "insufficient," and supposed the
case where "A, a land owner, has granted an easement to every person in the
state [and out of the state, too] to walk across his land except to B." A's
right that B shall not enter has now become a "unital" right, although formerly
it was one of many, "multital." He adds, "Yet, there can be no doubt that this
right is only a right in ren." But there is doubt, because it depends solely upon
one's chosen definition. If "multital"-ness is the definitional attribute of right
in rem, then this right against B, having lost this attribute, has become in
personan.
Professor Kocourek's definition seems to possess the very same weakness
that he asserts against Hohfeld's definition; i.e., we can find at least one case
where it does not work. Suppose that the investitive'facts are such that we know
that the duties correlative to A's rights in rem are absolutely universal. Are
not the persons bearing the duties directly identified by these investitive facts?
In Professor Kocourek's case of an infant born alive, with his "general right
of corporal integrity," it is conceivable that there is not a single person who does
not owe the -correlative duty. The duty bearers are just as directly identified
by the investitive facts as in Professor Kocourek's case, illustrating rights in
personam, of "a contract with the B Co., an unincorporated association, consisting
of a thousand members." Would Professor Kocourek assert that the infant's
right is not in rem?
The fact is that there is no substantial difference between a right in rem in
A against B and !. right in personam in A against B. The investitive facts
creating the two kinds of rights may be identical (e. g., an executed sale of goods
on credit), the societal force is always the same, and the physical acts that
state agents will do by *iay of enforcement are the same. The collateral facts
of "multital"-ness and absence of identification of the duty-bearers are both
interesting, and very likely each has some practical juristic significance (e. g.,
on 'burden of proof'). Whether or not we should adopt either one as a defini-
tional attribute is a mere question of convenience. But having made a choice,
our definition is not invalidated merely because there can be found one or more
cases falling within some other definition but not within ours.
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community. If it is customary usage to say that in the second case
the parties are in a new legal relation, it would seem desirable to follow
the custom.
Two more brief illustrations similar to the second case, where Hoh-
feld used the terms privilege and no-right: Suppose that A asks B
concerning the character of B's former servant, C, now applying for a
position with A. B is under no duty to answer at all, but he -has the
privilege of answering, and, if he answers without malice and in a
truthful spirit, we predict that "the law" will do nothing to him even
though his statement is untrue and injurious to C. A legal privilege
has replaced his former duty not to make the false statement.
Suppose again that in a friendly bout A gives to B "leave and license"
to knock A's hat off. B tries hard, cuffs A often in the attempt, but
fails. A is too good a man and his resistance is too strong. Here no
wrong is done. B had the legal privilege of cuffing and A the legal
privilege of resisting. The social giant would neither help B to get the
hat off nor help A to keep it on. Within the limits of reasonable vio-
lence there is no societal command to either party. But before the leave
and license B's cuffs would have been assault and battery. B's priv-
ilege has superseded his former duty not to assault and is not accom-
panied by a right that A shall not obstruct. Our custom is to say that
B's act has become "lawful." Is not this the law? Shall we so far
depart from usage as to say that B's act is law-less ?5
Of course, in the vast sum total of combinations of fact, there may
be many more in which the state agents will not act than in which they
will. If so, it is immaterial. Many combinations of fact never arise for
the adjudication of a court or for the opinion of a law instructor. Some
of them are taken care of by the unconscious folkways; and no rule of
law, no rule indicating uniformity of action by societal agents, has ever
been expressed. Until such a rule can be constructed, we do not talk
of legal rights and duties or of legal privileges.6
'See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1913) 23 YALE LAw JouRNAL,
I6, 2, note 59. Professor Kocourek in The Hohfeld System (1920) 15 ILI. L
REv. 24, 35, n. 28, puts the following cases: (i) The privilege of X, the owner
of land, to enter on his land. (2) The privilege of a householder to eject a
trespasser. (3) The privilege of uttering a libel. (4) The privilege against
self-crimination. (5) The privilege of entering on the land of another by
license. He assumes that in these cases the term "privilege," as used by Hohfeld,
confused "liberty, privilege, and power." In fact, in each case the term privilege
expressed merely the fact that society would not penalize the party for his
act (or failure to act, as in the fourth example). This is certainly a "juristic
fact" of importance and is the same in each case. As to whether or not it is
also a "jural relation," consult the text above. In each case, the rule to be
applied indicates a uniformity of societal action and is a rule of law. It seems
to be Professor Kocourek's idea that in certain cases where society will not
penalize a person for his act, this fact is a mere "juristic fact" and not a
jural relation.
'This is why the law does not "break down with its own weight." See i5
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In his recent articles, referred to at the beginning, Professor Ko-
courek has taken Hohfeld's classification and these eight terms, and,
while adopting them in greater or less degree, has criticised and has
re-defined. With his differences in detail this paper will' not undertake
to deal. Even though we adhere rigidly to Hohfeld, a considerable
part of Professor Kocourek's work will be sound and applicable. But
a certain difference in his chosen definition of the term "jural relation"
greatly complicates his analysis and multiplies his terms. He has eight
"nexal" relations and eight more "simple" or "quasi-jural" relations
and eight more "naked" relations. I must leave the explanation of this
analysis to Professor Kocourek's own printed articles.7
It. L RZEv. 36. The "law" does not "supervise every possible act of liberty."
A state agent seldom "supervises" any such act. The law has indeed become so
complex and detailed as to be beyond the mastery of one man. The courts
daily consider new facts and construct new rules for determining whether
society will or will not act. But Professor Kocourek cannot get rid of the rules
that certain facts will not move society to action merely by affirming that privilege
and no-right are mere negations. They are also affirmations that society will
not penalize the holder of the privilege when he acts in the privileged way. So
also are duty and right negations, for they negative the existence of privilege
and no-right. They are also affirmations that society will penalize the holder
of the duty when he acts in the un-privileged way. Each concept can be put
in either a positive or a negative form (privilege-=no duty; duty = no privi-
lege), but the concept expressed remains identical.
It seems quite incorrect to say, as does Professor Kocourek in his article
supra, p. 216, that one who sues to obtain a declaratory judgment is merely
a "denier" of some jural relation. One who denies the existence of one jural
relation between two persons always also asserts the existence of the negative
relation; he denies that the existing facts operate to cause one sort of societal
action and he asserts that they operate to cause another sort. Even aside from
this, he may be asking for a declaration of one or more of the jural relations
that Professor Kocourek regards as "positive" and not negative. He may
assert a right in himself and a duty in the defendant, and ask for a mere
declaration thereof without any judgment on which a writ of execution might
issue and without any mandatory order to the defendant.
If the text above establishes that Professor Kocourek's definition of jural
relation, is not the one commonly understood and accepted, and if another
definition affords greater simplicity of analysis and equal clearness of expression,
it becomes quite unprofitable to follow Professor Kocourek in his complex
analysis based upon his conclusions in detail. A re-study of Hohfeld's explan-
ation and illustrations would be of advantage, but a re-statement of them here
is not necessary for those who are willing to give the concentrated effort required
to master the problem. See Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 YA.LE LAw JouRxAr, i6; (1917) 26 id. 710;
Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919) 29 YALE LAw JoU NAL, i63.
That Professor Kocourek's "simple" or "quasi-jural relations" are artificial
and of little utility is indicated by the fact that a person may be under a "simple
duty" to pay money at the same time that he has a "simple privilege:' not to
pay it. "Thus if X has a claim against Y which is barred by the sthtute of
limitations, X has a claim against Y to an act of performance, but Y has a
simple privilege to decline performance. . . . Since claim and privilege are
jural negatives, it is evident that in jural relations (strict sense) such a conflict
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He admits the complexity of his result and the difficulty of making
some of the distinctions that he thinks necessary to make.8 In order
to promote accuracy, he would perhaps have invented twenty-four
entirely new terms to describe his twenty-four relations, except for
the fact that, to quote his own words, "invention here encounters
the great, if not insuperable, difficulty of overcoming an inveterate
usage which has appropriated a single series of terms for every variety
of legal and non-legal situation, and it seems best, therefore, to com-
promise with it."
Hohfeld effected this compromise at a convenient and serviceable
point. He followed "inveterate usage" closely enough to be understood
by the average lawyer. He accepted the fundamental concepts "as
used in judicial reasoning." The community and the lawyers and the
courts persist in describing certain situations of fact as legal (or jural)
situations, and they describe as a rule of law any expressed *rule for
determining the action of societal agents. Hohfeld yielded to their
unreasonable practice. All that was necessary was for him to see jural
relations with their eyes, and to identify the several fundamental varie-
ties of factual situations and to describe them in ordinary human words.
He did not overlook the obvious distinction between cases where societal
constraint exists and cases where it does not. The existence of such
constraint in the form of impending and predictable action by state
agents is one of the most important facts with which we deal. But the
could never exist." i9 MIcH. L. REv. 57. A "simple" contradictory that does
not contradict and a "quasi-jural" negative that does not negate has no place
in legal terminology. The jural situation is readily described by saying that
after the statutory bar Y is under no legal duty (he has the privilege of not
paying), but that the facts are still operative to give to Y the power of creating a
legal duty by new promissory words. There is no sufficient reason for defining
the term "power" so as to exclude the case where the new legal relations to be
created are disadvantageous. A power is always both constitutive and abrogative
according to Hohfeld's classification of legal relations, for it always changes
societal action from what it would have been to what it now will be.
8As one possible method of avoiding this difficulty and complexity of termin-
ology, Professor Kocourek suggests that we might "ignore any distinction
between jural (nexal) and non-jural relations." This he thinks was Hohfeld's
method; and he heartily disapproves of it, saying in ig Mfcn. L. Rav. 47, 53,
note, that it is as unproductive for legal analysis as "the discredited philosophic
effort to milk a he-goat through a sieve." But at the worst, this discredited
attempt at milking is merely "unproductive," and is far less destructive and
wasteful than milking a she-goat through a sieve. Doubtless the thousand milky
drops of terminology thus produced would refresh the dry earth with divine
nourishment; but whose parched and merely human lips will they reach?
In order to escape the difficulty and complexity of terminology, it is not
necessary to "ignore any distinction between jural (nexal) and non-jural rela-
tions"; it is merely necessary to ignore Professor Kocourek's distinction between
them, and to accept the terms "jural" and "legal" in accordance with inveterate
usage.
"9 I MICH. L. REv. 47, 54, note.
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term "legal duty" covers every possible case where this fact exists.1 0
Legal duty means compulsion by society through its executive andjudicial agents. It means that to lawyer and to judge and to the manin the street. There might be little harm in defining the term "jural
relation" so as to include nothing but rights and duties, in maintaining
that no group of facts is "jural" unless constraint by'socety is one of
them. Privilege, power, and immunity might be called "simple" or
"quasi-jural" relations, although the word "simple" makes a weak
appeal, and the term "quasi-jural" is worse. But it is harmful to con-
struct a terminology of unnecssary complexity, widely departing from
existing usage. It makes both thought and expression more difficult
and it cannot be crammed into unwilling mouths.
Hohfeld's eight terms are adequate for the analysis of jural situa-
tions of fact. Consider the case of a "right of entry" possessed by A
as against B. This may connote the following facts: (i) that there is
no constraint on A to prevent his entering; (2) that there is constraint
on B to prevent him from obstructing A's entry; (3) that after A's
entry there will be constraint on third persons as well as on B to pre-
vent them from disturbing A. The term privilege in A (with its cor-
relative no-right in B) expresses the first of these concepts; A has theprivilege of entering. The term right in A (with its correlative dutyin B) expresses the second; B has the duty not to obstruct A's entry.
The term power in A (with its correlative liability in B) expresses the
third; A has the power to regain complete "title" along with possession.
These three facts cd-exist in this case, but they are not necessarily co-
existent in all cases. The fact that there is no constraint on A may exist
even though there is also no constraint on B; but the fact that A is
under no constraint is the same identical fact whether the constraint ofB accompanies it or not. Where they do co-exist, we do not need to
confuse them into a single concept and to invent a new term like "nexal
privilege" to describe it.
" The predictable societal action may be "impending" only at a future date,
or only after some additional fact, the occurrence of which is uncertain. Inthe latter case, the customary term is conditional duty. Frequently several
operative facts must occur in order to create a presently enforceable duty.We need a term to express the fact that several of these operative facts havealready occurred and that the perfect jural relation awaits the occurrence of one
or more other facts. The term "conditional" serves this purpose, the awaitedfacts being described as conditions precedent.
Any of the jural relations may be thus conditional. A power may be dependent
upon a condition, in which case there is no actual power until the event occurs(although we may speak of a "conditional power"); or the power may beactual and unconditional, but the jural relations that its possessor can create
may themselves be conditional on a future event. See Hanbury v. Bateman[Ig2o] i Ch. 313, in which B had a power to charge certain estates with a paymentin case they should come into possession of B's wife by the death of C. B
executed a deed before C's death, and it was held operative.
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Consider also a voidable contract. X promises to deliver a Roman
chariot to an infant, who promises in return to pay $io,ooo one month
after delivery. The acts of offer and acceptance are here not void.
They are legally operative facts. They create a legal duty in X to
deliver; but the infant has the legal privilege of not paying. The
infant has a power of disaffirmance at once, a power to terminate his
own right to delivery and the duty of X to deliver. On becoming 21,
and in the absence of a disaffirmance, he will have a power of ratifica-
tion, a power to substitute a duty of paying in place of his privilege
not to pay, and a disability to disaffirm in place of his power of disaf-
firmance.
Differences in definition of the term "jural relation" may be caused by
like differences as to the nature of law and its function. Must a rule of
law always be a societal command backed by force? It is perilous to try
to state the juristic ideas of another man, it is so easy to misunderstand
and to mis-state. But one who thinks that there can be no rule of law
and no jural relation between men without societal constraint seems to
insist that law does nothing but command. There is no doubt that the
command element is of the utmost importance; and according to Hoh-
feld's classification this element is the factor that defines rights and
duties. But it seems to some of us that society not only commands, but
also permits and enables and disables. The rules that determine these
permissions and enablings and disablings are rules that law schools
have to teach, that lawyers have to use in advising clients, and that
courts have to create and apply in rendering judgments. And this is
true whether there is any societal command or constraint then existing
or not. It is difficult to see any element of societal constraint in the
concept of permission or of enabling or of disabling. Of course the
act permitted may be one of physical constraint against another person;
and an enabling act of a legislature may enable certain persons to cause
societal constraint. Of course, also, the element of constraint may
co-exist with the element of permission or the element of enabling.
This is merely to say that society may not be constraining A for B's
benefit at the very same time that it is constraining B for A's benefit.
But these two facts remain independent facts even though they co-
exist in time. Constraint is not a part of the permission (the privilege)
of A; and permission is not an element in the constraint (the legal
duty) of B.
In all our discussions of legal analysis, in all our attempts at defining
terms or at coining them, we should never cease to bear in mind and
give warning that mere legal analysis does not by itself enable us to
tell what the law is in a single case. The ability to recognize and to
define rights and duties, powers and privileges, and the other relations,
does not tell us whether or not they exist in a given case or what facts
operate to create them. Rules of law are not constructed by mere
analysis and mere logic. As a basis for such construction the judges
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may appeal to "natural justice" or some similar abstraction, to public
policy, to "eternal" justice, to the "right" as opposed to wrong, to the
settled convictions of the community, to business and social custom, to
the mores of the time."1 Of course, people do not agree in their no-
tions of right and justice. They do not agree on the policies that
make for general welfare and for individual survival. The interests of
nations and.of individuals are often necessarily in conflict. We can
therefore expect war and litigation; and in many important fields the
living law will continue to be inconsistent and uncertain. The jurist
must therefore be educated in legal history, in anthropology, in econom-
ics and social science. But although it is among these that "justice" is
to be found, and not in mere logical analysis, it remains equally true that
in our search for justice we need desperately to be equipped with the
keenest and the truest analytical weapons. Terminology and analysis
are the tools that we must use in the process of applying the precedents
and in stating rules and policies. They are vitally important tools.
They clear the ground and lay bare the underlying legal and social
problem to be solved. Without them, we may not see this underlying
problem at all; and even if we see it, we may, get lost in the inaccuracy
and confusion of our own verbosity.
"In Whitaker v. Lane (I92o, Va.) 1O4 S. E. 252, the court said: "it cannot be
that a rule merely established by precedent is infallible. This would stay all
progress and forbid all development If the rule established by precedent is
highly technical and finds its origin in reasons which no longer exist, and the
courts have from time to time found it necessary to make exceptions thereto to
meet the needs and methods of doing business in modem times, it would seem
that the courts should adapt their procedure to the age in which we live and cease
to follow a precedent for which they have always to apologise and declare that it
is highly technical and not justified by either reason or policy."
